CIP Browser

The Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to incorporate staking rewards into vesting account schedules, dynamically updating vesting schedules to include newly earned rewards. This mechanism ensures that reward tokens remain subject to an account's existing lockup constraints, providing incentive to secure the network through staking while maintaining the purpose of lockup accounts. By integrating staking rewards into the lockup schedule, the proposal promotes consistency, security, and simplicity in the network's token management.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to disable the automatic claiming of staking rewards when modifying delegations, allowing users to intentionally choose when to claim their rewards. The proposed change removes the auto-claim functionality, instead storing accrued rewards until a user explicitly calls for withdrawal, thereby avoiding unintended reward-claiming events that can trigger tax or regulatory obligations. By decoupling reward claims from delegation operations, users can manage claiming events more intentionally and avoid surprise taxable events.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to decrease inflation and disinflation by 33% to moderate total issuance and reduce token dilution while maintaining a competitive yield for stakers. The proposal seeks to simplify the inflation schedule, aligning with Celestia's ethos, and provide a straightforward solution that can be adjusted in the future as the network's fee market and ecosystem mature. By reducing inflation, the proposal aims to ensure the long-term security and sustainability of the Celestia network.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to set a limit for transaction size at 2MiB to maintain network stability and provide clear expectations for users and developers. The proposal achieves this by setting the versioned parameter `MaxTxSize` to 2097152 bytes, which is checked against each transaction's size at various stages, rejecting or excluding those that exceed the limit. By implementing this limit, the proposal prioritizes network-wide consistency and stability while allowing for future scalability considerations.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal (CIP) aims to set limits for the number of PayForBlobs (PFBs) and non-PFBs messages per block to prevent long block times on the network. The proposal sets the limits to 600 PFBs messages and 200 non-PFB messages per block, which is not consensus-breaking but has a meaningful effect on users. By implementing these limits, the proposal balances network efficiency with block processing speed, ensuring a more stable and efficient network experience.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal introduces versioned timeouts, allowing the application version to control timeouts, starting from version 3, which enables automated block time adjustments. The proposal reduces the block time from 12 seconds to 6 seconds, effectively doubling the block rate and network throughput, and also increases the `ttl-num-blocks` parameter in the mempool configuration from 5 to 12 to maintain consistency. This change aims to simplify the process of adjusting block time and improve the overall efficiency of the Celestia network.

The Ginger Network Upgrade, outlined in CIP 25, is a meta proposal that aggregates several state-breaking changes, including updates to gas scheduler variables, timeouts, block limits, and transaction size limits. This upgrade requires the activation of CIPs 21, 24, 26, 27, and 28, which are all linked and described in the proposal. The implementation of these changes will result in a breaking network upgrade, with activation details differing from previous upgrades as described in CIP 10.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal (CIP) 24 introduces versioned gas scheduler variables, transitioning gas scheduler parameters to be updated only through hard fork upgrades, rather than governance modifications. This change aims to stabilize gas estimation by removing block-to-block variability, allowing for more predictable transaction costs. By making these variables modifiable only through hard forks, the proposal simplifies the gas estimation process and makes transaction costs more predictable.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to achieve consistent block finality times by introducing coordinated prevote times, which involves withholding prevotes until a proposal timeout has elapsed. The proposed mechanism modifies the current system by delaying prevotes until the `TimeoutPropose` has passed, ensuring a more consistent cadence in block finalization. By implementing this solution, the network can provide users with a more predictable and consistent block finality experience, regardless of block size.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to remove the IndexWrapper, a data structure containing indices of blobs referenced by PayForBlobs transactions, to simplify the creation of a deterministic square layout. By removing the indices, the proposal replaces the need for compact fraud proofs with zero-knowledge proofs to verify blob inclusion rules, increasing efficiency. This change is a breaking consensus update, but its impact is limited to specific rollup teams, such as Sovereign SDK, which will need to adapt their circuits to the new version.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal introduces a new blob type that includes a verified signer address, simplifying the verification process for rollups that use a fork-choice rule based on a specific sequencer. This new blob type allows validators to verify the signer's address directly, reducing the complexity and computational overhead of the current process. By including the signer address in the blob itself, this proposal streamlines the verification flow for rollups, making it more efficient and easier to implement.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to disable the Blobstream module in celestia-app, as it is no longer needed due to the deprecation of the original Blobstream architecture in favor of Blobstream X. The proposal outlines the necessary changes, including preventing the state machine from accepting new transactions and queries related to the Blobstream module, and removing a related parameter. By disabling the Blobstream module, the proposal reduces the functionality and state maintenance requirements of the celestia-app state machine.

The Shwap Protocol is a new messaging framework designed to improve the efficiency and scalability of Celestia's Data Availability network by standardizing messaging and reducing roundtrips. This framework allows for trust-minimized messaging without enforcing specific transport or application layer protocols, enabling it to be stacked with other protocols like HTTP/x, KadDHT, or Bitswap. By implementing Shwap, the network aims to achieve O(1) roundtrip for multiple samples, significantly improving the performance and scalability of the Data Availability Sampling network.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal introduces a standardized interface for estimating gas usage and gas pricing for transactions, aiming to improve user experience by providing a reliable and accurate estimation service. The proposed interface, implemented using gRPC, allows clients to query gas estimations and pricing based on transaction priority, promoting competition among third-party providers to offer the best services. By standardizing this interface, Celestia enables a more seamless and efficient transaction submission process for users.

The Lemongrass Network Upgrade, outlined in CIP 17, is a meta proposal that aggregates several state-breaking changes, including price enforcement, packet forward middleware, and interchain accounts, which require a coordinated network upgrade. This upgrade will activate a set of previously approved CIPs, specifically CIP-6, CIP-9, CIP-10, CIP-14, and CIP-20, to introduce new features and modifications to the Celestia network. The activation of this upgrade will follow a unique process, as described in CIP-10, to ensure a smooth transition to the new network configuration.

This Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to make security-related governance parameters immutable to prevent potential inconsistencies and security risks. The proposal specifically targets the `consensus.evidence.MaxAgeDuration` and `consensus.evidence.MaxAgeNumBlocks` parameters, seeking to modify their `Changeable via Governance` attribute from `True` to `False`. By doing so, the proposal seeks to mitigate the risks associated with on-chain governance modifications, ensuring the robustness and reliability of the Celestia network.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal aims to discourage the use of transaction memos by modifying two authentication parameters, reducing the maximum allowed memo characters and increasing the cost per byte, to prevent misuse of the memo field for arbitrary data publication. This proposal seeks to mitigate risks to the Celestia network posed by protocols building on top of the memo field, which was not designed for such purposes. By discouraging memo usage, the proposal aims to maintain the network's efficiency and scalability.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal (CIP-14) aims to integrate Interchain Accounts (ICA) into Celestia, enabling cross-chain account management and enhancing interoperability with external chains. This integration, as defined by ICS-27, allows one chain to control accounts on another chain, facilitating use cases such as liquid staking and other DeFi applications. By implementing ICA, Celestia can improve its compatibility with other IBC-enabled blockchains, providing a more seamless experience for users and expanding its potential use cases.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal (CIP) 13 aims to establish on-chain governance parameters for the Celestia network, providing a transparent reference for contributors by outlining global and module-specific parameters. Although the proposal has been withdrawn, its purpose was to facilitate discussions about on-chain parameters and ensure their values are easily accessible. The parameters include both changeable and hardcoded values, such as MaxBlockBytes and MaxSquareSize, which are crucial for the network's operation.

The Celestia Improvement Proposal (CIP) 12 aims to introduce ICS-29 relayer incentivisation middleware to promote sustainable relayer funding for Inter-Blockchain Communication (IBC) by rewarding relayers with fees for delivering packets promptly. This middleware, implemented at both ends of an IBC channel, enables relayers to receive fees upon proving they have relayed a given packet, thereby incentivising fast and reliable packet delivery. The proposal seeks to address the current unsustainable reliance on subsidised or loss-based relaying arrangements, ensuring a more robust and long-term solution for IBC packet delivery.